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Christopher Lord (Reading, UK)
Democratic Control of the Council of
Ministers
Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Begriff der „dualen Repräsentation“ und den darin enthaltenen Anspruch,
dass einzelne Mitglieder des Rats der Europäischen Union von ihren nationalen Parlamenten politisch
zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden können, während der Rat als Ganzes im Rahmen eines Systems der
„checks & balances“ dem Europäischen Parlament verantwortlich ist. Der Beitrag evaluiert eine Reihe
möglicher Beschränkungen der Kapazität nationaler Parlamente, das Verhalten ihre eigenen Regierun-
gen im EU-Rat zu kontrollieren, einschließlich der Entscheidungsregeln der Union, der Intransparenz
des Rates, von Informationsasymmetrien und der Struktur der nationalen politischen Systeme. Was das
Europäische Parlament anlangt, argumentiert der Beitrag, dass dessen Macht schon dadurch beschränkt
ist, dass es den Rat nicht kontrollieren, sondern nur über ein System der „checks & balances“ beaufsich-
tigen soll. In dem Ausmaß, in dem diese Beschränkungen ihrerseits die Politisierung der Parla-
mentarierInnen und deren Wahl auf der Grundlage von Wettbewerb und einer für das Funktionieren der
Union relevanten Auswahl verhindern, stellt die „duale Repräsentation“ selbst ein Hindernis für die
Entwicklung „direkter“ Repräsentation in der EU-Arena dar.
Keywords: representation, democracy, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, national parlia-
ment
Repräsentation, Demokratie, Rat der Europäischen Union, Europäisches Parlament,
nationales Parlament
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1. Introduction
The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution
for the European Union contained a section en-
titled the ‘democratic life of the Union’ (A1-
46). After proclaiming that ‘the functioning of
the Union shall be founded on representative
democracy’ the section stated that ‘citizens are
directly represented at Union level in the Euro-
pean Parliament’ and ‘Member States are rep-
resented in the European Council by their Heads
of State or Government and in the Council by
their governments, themselves democratically
accountable either to their national Parliaments,
or to their citizens’ (Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Union, C310/1-474, 2004). Yet, the
claim that the Union is open to dual democratic
representation and control became common
place in the statements of member governments
and Union institutions long before the Consti-
tutional Treaty. Typical of the genre is Tony
Blair’s contribution to the future of Europe de-
bate in 2000. After claiming that ‘the directly
elected and representative institutions of the
nation states – the national governments and
parliaments – are the primary sources’ of demo-
cratic control at Union level, Blair went on to
argue that ‘the European Parliament is’ none the
less ‘a vital part of the checks and balances of
the EU’ (UK Government 2000).
This article evaluates the notion that mem-
bers of the Council of Ministers can be indi-
vidually responsible to national democratic in-
stitutions whilst being collectively checked and
balanced by the European Parliament. The
evaluation assumes that public control with po-
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litical equality are the core attributes of democ-
racy (Beetham 1994, 28; Weale 1999, 14) and
that popularly elected representative bodies are
necessary – though not always sufficient – to
secure those attributes. This, in turn, raises ques-
tions of institutional design that are best intro-
duced by means of the following quotation from
John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government
(1972 [1861], 229):
It is an open question what actual functions … should
be discharged by the representative body. Great va-
rieties are compatible with the essence of representa-
tive government, provided the functions are such as
to secure to the representative body the control of
everything in the last resort.
In effect, then, Mill assumes that public con-
trol can be multidisciplinary (it can take a vari-
ety of means) provided it is comprehensive in
scope (it covers all public policy) and it is sin-
gular (it is exercised by a single representative
body). Although this last assumption of singu-
larity is typical of parliamentary systems (Strøm
2003, 66), the notion of dual representation at
Union level clearly departs from it. If, indeed,
there is any substance to dual representation it
would imply the Union has some similarities
with the multiple competing centres of public
control associated with presidential systems,
though with two differences. First, the Union
does not of course have a single chief execu-
tive. Second, the different representative bod-
ies with a controlling role in EU matters belong
to different political systems and constitutional
orders. Attempts to co-ordinate incentives and
norms to produce specific governance standards
are thus likely to be more complex, uneven and
problematic than in single state systems.
In spite of such differences, it is understand-
able why multi-polar forms of public control
might be thought best for the Union. First, the
absence of a European Union demos probably
precludes the concentrated forms of public con-
trol associated with conventional parliamentary
politics.
Second, a dispersion of controlling powers
between mutually watchful representatives
elected at different levels may be a good sec-
ond-best solution (Héritier 1997), so long as
there are constraints on how far any representa-
tion at Union level can be ‘direct’ in the full
sense of the term. Even members of the one
representative institution that is directly elected
at the Union level do not often seem to be elected
on the basis of competition and choice relevant
to the operation of the Union itself (Reif/Schmitt
1980; though, also see Schmitt/Thomassen
2000). We will return to this problem in the con-
clusion.
Third, the Union, arguably, typifies devel-
opments in modern governance that have called
into question the possibility – as Giandomenico
Majone (2005, 85) puts it – of ‘control being
exercised from one fixed point on the political
spectrum’. Organisation of expertise needed for
effective policy delivery increasingly requires
policy-makers to operate in networks which
challenge the political and administrative chains
of delegation by which responsibility to repre-
sentative bodies has been secured in the past.
Thus, in the case of the European Union, repre-
sentative bodies may secure less control by fol-
lowing formal demarcations of who is responsi-
ble for what; and more by recognising that the
real locus of decision-making may often lie in
the collaborations and shared assumptions that
bring together policy specialists from different
Union institutions, from the national and Union
levels, and even from the private and public
spheres (Jachtenfuchs 2001; Kohler-Koch 1996).
Such conditions of procedural and substan-
tive complexity may not invalidate conventional
accounts of representation that emphasise a need
to relate all issues to all others, and relate that
blend, in turn, to common sense understandings
of the needs and values. But greater complexity
in the executive processes they seek to control
does require representative bodies to ground
their general understandings of policy problems
in access to more specialised forms of expertise
that can only be cultivated through divisions of
labour between representatives themselves. On
the one hand, the thematic complexity of policy
may require those divisions of labour to be
multi-disciplinary (i.e. organised for the accu-
mulation and deployment of different control-
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ling skills). On the other, the spatial complexity
of policy may require the divisions of labour to
be multi-level (i.e. to operate simultaneously at
the EU, national and sub-national levels).
In sum, then, dual representation amounts
to a claim that national parliaments and the EP
should interact to produce satisfactory stand-
ards of public control, and that neither should
be expected to be sufficient on its own. Yet, the
roles in Union matters of national parliaments
and of the European Parliament have hitherto
been studied more in isolation than in interac-
tion. To correct this would be a huge undertak-
ing. This article attempts a modest beginning.
In the hope of motivating and facilitating fur-
ther research into where the limitations of the
two components of dual representation are mu-
tually compounding, mutually compensating or
neither, the article evaluates the individual re-
sponsibility of Council Members to national
parliaments (section 2) and the collective ca-
pacity of the EP to check and balance Council
decisions (section 3). A concluding section then
summarises shortcomings in the two roles.
2. Responsibility of Individual Council
Members to Ministers to National
Parliaments
Whatever their role in Treaty authorisation,
are national parliaments in any position to ex-
ercise continuing control of Council decisions?
The broad facts of their involvement are well-
known. Under a legally binding protocol to the
Amsterdam Treaty, draft legislation, Commis-
sion White and Green Papers and Communica-
tions, and all documents related to the ‘creation
of an area of Freedom and Justice’ (mainly JHA)
have to be forwarded to national parliaments six
weeks before they are put on the Council’s
agenda (Treaty on European Union, protocol 9).
In some Member States, control of the Union’s
agenda can be further aligned with the needs of
national parliaments through scrutiny reserves,
which limit the right of ministers to agree mat-
ters in the Council that are still under consid-
eration in their parliaments.
Yet, national parliaments are quite different
in the diligence of their scrutiny and in their
powers to act on it. Only some can issue in-
structions their governments are either legally
or politically obliged to follow. Following the
2004 enlargement, the Conference of the Euro-
pean Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of
the European Union (COSAC) classifies Aus-
tria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia
and Sweden as Member States whose parlia-
ments can mandate governments to take a par-
ticular position in the Council. Of these COSAC
describes all but the Austrian and Hungarian
parliaments as having arrangements for system-
atic mandating where ‘governments are in prin-
ciple obliged to present a negotiating position
to the committees on all pieces of draft legisla-
tion to be adopted by the Council’. The Lithua-
nian parliament classifies issues as ‘red’, ‘yel-
low’ and ‘green’ in the expectation that in the
first two cases its government will present it
with a negotiating position for parliamentary
approval 15 days before a Council decision
(COSAC 2005a, 12). Also worth noting is that
the Dutch and German Parliaments have par-
tial mandating powers (respectively over pillar
three decisions and matters touching on the
competence of the Länder). Indeed, the Ger-
man Länder demonstrate how ‘democratic prin-
cipals’ can even be incorporated into national
delegations to Council meetings. For all the re-
mainder of cases not mentioned in this para-
graph, national parliaments, have, in the words
of a report prepared for the Convention, ‘more
or less effective systems for expressing their
views on a legislative proposal, while leaving
their respective governments free to decide
whether to take them into account’ (European
Convention 2002, 6).
Still, whatever their powers, national par-
liaments are widely believed to experience com-
mon constraints in exercising public control over
the behaviour of their own governments in the
Council. The paragraphs that follow analyse
constraints that relate to the Union’s decision-
rules, the opacity of the Council, informational
costs of scrutinising another political system,
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and the varied character of executive-legislature
relations in Member States.
The relationship between Council voting
rules and the role of national parliaments
presents something of a puzzle. Although the
empowerment of the European Parliament has
been justified on the grounds that governments
cannot be held responsible to their own parlia-
ments for decisions on which they may have
been out-voted in the Council, national parlia-
mentary involvement in Union matters has not
decreased with the development since the 1980s
of a more majoritarian Council. To the contrary,
it is only in the last twenty years that the prac-
tice of designating at least one national parlia-
mentary committee with responsibility for Eu-
ropean Community Affairs has been general-
ised to most Member States. Most telling of all,
the national parliaments of all but two of the 13
Member States which joined in 1995 and 2004
(Cyprus and Malta) chose to use their influence
over Treaty ratification to secure some powers
to mandate the behaviour of their governments
in the Council.
This increased national parliamentary in-
volvement may well be a response to the greater
weight and visibility of Council decisions in the
ordinary lives of voters in the post-Maastricht
European Union. In some Member States it may
also be the product of an increased politicisation
of Union issues in the processes by which na-
tional parliamentarians are elected and compete
for office. It is thus possible that greater
Europeanisation of the domestic arena has
stimulated national parliamentary involvement
in Union matters at the very moment that insti-
tutional developments have made the European
arena less tractable to their control. It would,
however, be a mistake to over-state how far
majority voting in the Council departs from
procedurally ideal conditions for national par-
liamentary control. For the most part, the Coun-
cil continues to decide by consensus even where
majority voting is available to it (Mattila/Lane
2001).
Turning from decision-rules to problems of
transparency, modern scholars identify asym-
metries of information as amongst the principal
means by which modern executives dominate
legislatures (Krehbiel 1991). Thus it is already
a challenge to national parliaments that the com-
plexity of Union policies and institutions often
require a special expertise that is costly for those
who have no permanent presence within the
Union’s political system to acquire and sustain.
As one MEP interviewed for the Democratic
Audit of the EU put it: ‘It is an institutional sys-
tem that you really do need to experience di-
rectly if you are to understand it. I have often
found that those who visit for even 2-3 days have
a grasp that is not shared by others’ (Lord 2004,
181).
Such difficulties are compounded by the
closed nature of Council decision-making. Al-
though the results of Council votes are published
(European Community Treaty, A. 207 (3)) op-
portunities for publics and their representatives
to follow the deliberations of the Council prior
to voting are more limited. At the time of writ-
ing, the Council only holds open meetings at
the very beginning and at the very end of Co-
decision – when the Commission presents its
proposals and when the Council agrees a final
text (COSAC 2005b, 44). Not only does this
challenge the principle that all legislation should
be a public act, but the restriction of open meet-
ings to Co-decision, rather than Consultation,
bizarrely implies that the closer the Council
approximates the role of sole legislator without
check and balance from the publicly visible
European Parliament, the more secretive should
be its deliberations.
In addition to raising the cost of monitoring
the behaviour of their governments in the Coun-
cil, non-transparency may dampen the incen-
tive for national parliamentarians to invest their
time into the scrutiny of Union decisions. Given
evidence of successive Eurobarometers that the
Council is the least known of the four main
Union institutions (Lord 2004, 57) – even
though it is, arguably, the most powerful – and
focus group evidence that several national pub-
lics see their own governments as mere bystand-
ers to Union decisions (European Commission
2000), voters are unlikely to reward or sanction
their parliamentarians for scrutinising Council
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decisions, or even to be aware that opportunity
is available.
Even, however, if they had perfect informa-
tion about Council deliberations and decision-
making, national parliaments would still face the
costs of converting that information into a full
and effective scrutiny. As Tapio Raunio (1999,
188) remarks, only national parliaments whose
EACs meet weekly are likely to be engaged in
line-by-line scrutiny of Union business. In the
case of those parliaments which practice what
COSAC calls ‘documentary scrutiny’ (the sift-
ing of all texts received under the Amsterdam
protocol) a small and stable group of representa-
tives has to be delegated to perform the task on
behalf of the parliament as a whole if monitor-
ing is to benefit from the likelihood that under-
standing of the Union is governed by increas-
ing returns: that it is, in other words, a capabil-
ity that grows with use. Yet a tension can be
expected between such a division of labour and
the general-purpose nature of both national par-
liaments and of the Union’s own decision-mak-
ing. Several national parliaments have thus felt
compelled to attempt a difficult balance between
diffusing the coverage of Union affairs across a
range of committees, whilst concentrating a co-
ordinating role in the hands of a few representa-
tives with a more permanent focus on European
issues (COSAC 2005a, 13-15).
The EU’s extended policy cycle presents a
further challenge. In addition to monitoring ac-
tual decisions of the Council, national parlia-
ments are likely to be constrained in their con-
trolling role if they are not also active when
choices are structured in interaction with the
Commission, restructured in interaction with the
European Parliament, and then fleshed out into
detailed implementation rules through comi-
tology. Some examples from the experience of
the Scandinavian parliaments illustrate the scale
of the effort that may be required.
At the agenda-setting stage, the Danish
Folketing holds public hearings on Green and
White Papers. Parliamentary resolutions based
on the hearings are then forwarded to the Com-
mission (Folketinget 2002, 10). For its part, the
Finnish Parliament tries to influence the prepa-
ration of Council decisions by writing reports
that it then expects national officials to take into
account when participating in COREPER or
Council working groups.
In order to handle the converse risk that the
Union’s multi-stage decision-making may drift
substantially from the options on which its has
had an opportunity to express a view, the Swed-
ish parliament (Riksdag) expects Ministers to
remain over the course of Council bargaining
in continuous contact with the Chair of the EAC,
who will, in turn, telephone the leading com-
mittee member from each of the other political
parties to consult on any proposed deviation
from the parliament’s original position. Minutes
and voting records of Council meetings are then
used to check that the government has kept to
its commitments. The Swedish Government also
‘has to submit a written report of the position
that it has taken within 5 days of each Council
meeting, explaining what positions it has backed
and why’. Where the Government departs from
a mandate, the Riksdag’s EAC reserves the right
to take a vote on whether the deviation was jus-
tified and all MPs can pick up on any embar-
rassment of the government through ‘inter-
pellations’ in the full parliament (Hegeland/
Neuhold 2002, 6).
By way of a postscript, it is also worth men-
tioning that even arrangements as elaborate as
the foregoing are limited in how far they can
follow national parliamentary scrutiny through
to what is in many ways the final stage in Euro-
pean Community rule-making, namely the use
by Member States of Comitology committees
to oversee the Commission in the preparation
of guidelines for implementation. Since Comi-
tology is not covered by the Treaty protocol on
documents which must be supplied to national
parliaments for their scrutiny, national parlia-
ments must be sufficiently organised to follow
it for themselves by inspecting the Commis-
sion’s register of Comitology. A possible rea-
son why they have only rarely been motivated
to do this in practice (COSAC 2006, 28) is that
Comitology only comes into play once Com-
munity measures already have the force of law
and all Member States are any how obliged to
2007_02_2-lord.p65 31.05.2007, 14:13129
130 Christopher Lord
proceed with them in some form. Moreover, any
systematic attempt to extend scrutiny to Comi-
tology would hugely increase the time and re-
sources national parliaments have to give to
Union matters. As COSAC points out, the Un-
ion passes ten times as many implementing
measures as it passes full pieces of legislation.
In 2004, for example, the figures were respec-
tively 2625 and 278 (cit, 26-7).
In any case, it is unlikely that rigorous scru-
tiny procedures are sufficient to hold govern-
ments individually responsible to their national
parliaments for their behaviour in the Council.
Much depends on how far governments can
themselves control scrutiny committees. That,
in turn, depends on the overall structure of ex-
ecutive-legislative relations in each Member
State, and on party disciplines. Consider the
example of the United Kingdom. Although it
has experienced a politicisation of Union issues
that has motivated other national parliaments to
press for indirect participation in Council deci-
sions (Johanssen/Raunio 2001), the West-
minister Parliament arguably combines one of
the most painstaking with one of the most in-
consequential of scrutiny procedures. Whilst the
Commons scrutiny committee can force a de-
bate of the whole House, rules on parliamen-
tary time limit the number of occasions this is
possible, and, in any case, the government ma-
jority is always available to defeat a challenge
(Giddings/Drewry 1996). Indeed, the Govern-
ment can use its majority to over-ride a scrutiny
reserve and proceed to a decision in the Coun-
cil before the Commons committee has com-
pleted its work. There were 22 over-rides in the
second half of 2004 alone (COSAC 2005a, 11).
Austria provides a further example. Although
the only national parliament with the power to
issue legally binding mandates, party disciplines
ensure this is rare in practice (Hegeland/Neuhold
2002).
In other cases, powerful controls over the
behaviour of national governments in the Coun-
cil are better understood as effects of prior ex-
ecutive weakness in domestic systems, as op-
posed to transposable causes of national parlia-
mentary strength in the European arena. Na-
tional parliamentary mandating evolved in Den-
mark in response to conditions that are most
unlikely to be reproduced in many other Mem-
ber States. Some means had to be found of de-
termining how to use the Council decisions
rights assigned to a Member State where, as
David Arter (1999, 119-20) puts it, Govern-
ments are typically so much in the minority that
it is ‘opposition parties … that make decisions
in practice’.
In sum, then, this section has appraised dif-
ficulties in holding members of the Council in-
dividually responsible to national parliaments
that arise from Council voting rules, the opac-
ity of the Council, the opportunity costs in par-
liamentary time of scrutinising Union decisions
and variations in executive-legislature relations
across Member States. It suggests that the first
constraint has been over-stated. The second and
third constraints are important, though probably
best understood as an aggravation by the Un-
ion’s complex institutions of a general difficulty
faced by modern parliaments, namely asym-
metries of information in their dealings with the
executive bodies they are supposed to scruti-
nise. The fourth constraint affects some national
parliaments significantly more than others.
A little noticed corollary of this last point is
that exclusive reliance on national parliaments
would risk political inequality. How well indi-
viduals can be represented at Union level will
depend on where they live. How far they can
look to national parliaments to monitor Council
decisions and enforce standards of responsibil-
ity depends on executive-legislature relations in
each Member State. Where QMV really is used,
much will also depend on the decision weights
assigned to each country, a point not lost on
those commentators who use power indices to
demonstrate that the 5 largest States of the EU-
25 are between 8 to 9 times more likely than the
5 smallest to be pivotal to winning or blocking
coalitions of the Council (Paterson/Silársky
2003, 10; Strøm et al. 2003, 668).
Nor are national parliaments likely on their
own to meet the deliberative conditions for de-
mocracy. Short of Europeanising themselves
into an inter-parliamentary network that allowed
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each to reflect on the preferences of all, national
parliaments can only secure control over indi-
vidual Council Members in ways that open them
to Edmund Burke’s (1975 [1774], 175) famous
objection: ‘what sort of reason is it in which the
determination precedes the discussion, in which
one set of men deliberate and another decide,
and where those who form the conclusion are
perhaps three hundred miles distant from those
who hear the arguments?’
Of course, one possible riposte to all of this
is that the responsibility of individual Council
Members to national parliaments is not supposed
to produce collective democratic standards at
the European level. Matters would, however, be
more serious if the converse could be demon-
strated, namely that the collective operation of
the Council unnecessarily compromises indi-
vidual responsibility to national parliaments.
More systematic research is needed to investi-
gate whether this is indeed the case. But survey
and interview evidence already provides prima
facie cause for concern. COSAC surveys and
plenaries suggest national parliaments do feel
themselves constrained by faits accomplis which
emerge from bargaining relationships and deci-
sion-rules of which they can influence but a part.
Typical is a complaint by the representative of
the Irish Dail that texts often have an air of hav-
ing already ‘been passed by governments’ be-
fore they are forwarded to their national parlia-
ments (COSAC 2001, 33). Even national par-
liaments with the most rigorous procedures for
rendering their own governments individually
responsible for their contributions to Union de-
cisions, acknowledge a need to adapt their own
parliamentary control to distributions of power
and preferences between other Council mem-
bers. That, for example, is the implication of a
claim by an official of the Danish Folketing that
his own parliament has adapted to QMV by con-
centrating its scrutiny on those cases where its
government is most likely to be pivotal in the
Council (Lord 2004, 177).
By way of postscript it is, of course, possi-
ble that things could change significantly if any-
thing akin to the proposal in the Draft Treaty
establishing a Constitution allowing national
parliaments to challenge Commission propos-
als on the basis of subsidiarity is adopted. Un-
der such circumstances there would be strate-
gic advantage – and thus a competitive pres-
sure – on Member States to ensure their parlia-
ments have the power and expertise on Union
issues to network with others to form the one-
third of national parliaments needed to trigger a
challenge.
3. Checks and Balances? The European
Parliament and the Council
If there are limits to how far the Council can
be made accountable through the relationship
of its individual members to their national par-
liaments, does the Union compensate for these
in arrangements for the Council to be account-
able as a body to the EP? Responses to a survey
for the Democratic Audit of the European Un-
ion indicate MEPs are much less confident of
their public control of the Council than the Com-
mission. MEPs on average rate their capacity to
influence the Council at 3.23 on a scale of 0–
10. MEPs find the Council less transparent than
the Commission and better placed to evade re-
sponsibility by blaming someone else. When
asked to indicate how far non-transparency and
blame-shifting were obstacles to accountability,
MEPs answered 5.4 and 3.71 in the case of the
Commission and 8.57 and 6.47 in that of the
Council (all figures on a scale of 0–10). MEPs
also feel Council Members see themselves as
primarily responsible to their national parlia-
ments, while Council Presidencies vary in their
willingness to explain decisions to the EP. Given
that MEPs are less confident of their powers to
control the Council than the Commission, many
are understandably nervous that legislative and
executive powers may be drifting from the sec-
ond to the first (Lord 2004, 183).
But how justified is the pessimism of MEPs
about their powers to control the Council? Does
a more favourable assessment emerge once we
acknowledge that ‘supervisory’ forms of con-
trol are neither possible nor appropriate in the
relationship between the EP and the Council,
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whilst a system of mutually constraining checks
and balances is feasible?
If the EP really does have the capacity to
check and balance the Council, we would ex-
pect confirmation in studies of its legislative and
financial powers. Given that the Commission
frequently exercises its legislative initiative in
response to what member governments perceive
to be a need for Union-level law-making, it is
by no means far-fetched to interpret Co-deci-
sion as conferring a power on the EP to deny
the Council its legislation in a polity whose main
business is rule-making (Majone 2005, 37).
Council Members may accept significant EP
amendments rather than ‘return to go’ in a
lengthy legislative process that may have de-
pended on unique windows of opportunity in
domestic politics or on a complex ‘log-roll’ be-
tween themselves.
In addition to conferring veto powers, Co-
decision may allow the Parliament ‘agenda-set-
ting’ opportunities. As George Tsebelis (1994)
first pointed out in his study of legislative pow-
ers that have subsequently been subsumed into
Co-decision, it is ‘procedurally easier’ for the
Council to accept Parliamentary amendments.
Whereas it may only need a qualified majority
to adopt as a final text a revised Commission
proposal incorporating EP amendments, it needs
unanimity to substitute an alternative of its own.
Yet, in spite of some high profile clashes
between the EP and the Council in individual
Co-decisions, the aggregate data can be read as
suggesting that the EP is somewhat tame in its
efforts to check the Council in the legislative
process. It is relatively rare for Co-decisions to
be lost on account of an EP veto. It is also in-
creasingly common for Council, EP and Com-
mission to collude through trialogues to man-
age the legislative process. A declining propor-
tion of Co-decisions ‘go to the wire’ in the sense
of requiring a Conciliation committee to be con-
vened between the Parliament and Council
(COSAC 2005b, 48- 51).
In any case, many of the Parliament’s pow-
ers amount to a series of ‘bounded choices’.
Assuming, that it does not often want to veto
matters out-right, and that its main objective is
to pass the measure but with amendments of its
own, the EP can only check and balance the
Commission and Council within limits deter-
mined by the distribution of preferences within
those other institutions. Amie Kreppel (2000)
has analysed this most clearly in relation to leg-
islation. However, the bounded nature of choices
available to the EP can also be illustrated
through the example of its budgetary powers.
In relation to annual budgets:
– The EP has no powers over the revenue com-
ponent of the budget;
– the EP’s powers of amendment are only
procedurally strong in relation to the 54 per
cent of the budget consisting of non-com-
pulsory expenditure;
– even then, the EP is only able to vary non-
compulsory expenditure up to a ‘maximum
rate of increase’ of about 3 per cent a year;
– the EP has to keep to a number of sub-ceil-
ings laid down in seven year financial per-
spectives (Laffan 1997).
EP amendments typically only increase the
overall budget by around EUR 1m or one per
cent of the total. Since this roughly corresponds
to what the Council normally shaves off the
Commission’s proposal in the first place, some
MEPs have suggested that the whole process
approaches an empty ritual: ‘the Commission
presents a proposal, the Council takes a slice
off the proposed amount, the EP adds a bit more
in, and we are supposed to come up with some-
thing wonderful in conciliation’ (Kathalijne
Buitenweg MEP, Debates of the European Par-
liament, 11 December 2001).
Moving beyond annual budgetary rounds, a
further difficulty concerns the longer-term seven
year frameworks which govern the finances of
the Union. As the Parliament has noted as re-
cently as its report on the 2006 inter-institutional
agreement on budgetary discipline, a seven year
cycle necessarily means that financial frame-
works are not aligned with five year mandates
of the Commission and the Parliament. In the
EP’s view such an alignment would significantly
improve political responsibility for the expendi-
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ture of the Union’s resources (European Parlia-
ment 2006a, 7).
Still, a case can be made that bounded choice
is precisely what is to be expected in a system
of checks and balances whose purpose is pre-
cisely that no institution – the EP included –
should be able to dominate the others. A more
fundamental difficulty may be that demarcations
between decisions where the EP does and does
not have the power to check and balance the
Council sometimes appear more expedient than
principled.
Paul Magnette’s (1999) description of the
EU as ‘semi-parliamentary’ might be a harm-
less statement of the obvious were it simply a
corollary of another bon mot, namely Philippe
Schmitter’s observation that the Union really
amounts to a ‘plurality of polities at different
levels of aggregation’. However, the involve-
ment of the EP does not map neatly on to a dis-
tinction between Union decisions that employ
‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ modes
of aggregation. On the one hand the EP is ex-
cluded from parts of the first pillar where a case
can be made that decision rules, preference dis-
tributions and power relations operate with suf-
ficient autonomy in the European arena to re-
quire parliamentary control at that level. On the
other hand the EP pops up unexpectedly in pil-
lars two and three (Lord 2005), yet without a
consistency likely to satisfy those who believe
that all decisions taken at Union level should be
controlled by a Parliament at that level and with
expertise of it. The following paragraphs elabo-
rate.
Andreas Maurer’s (2003) distinction be-
tween ‘strong’ (Co-decision and assent proce-
dures) and ‘weak’ (Consultation procedure) par-
liamentary inclusion implies that even under
pillar one Council decisions are still only selec-
tively checked and balanced by the EP. Included
amongst cases where the EP is only consulted
are some instances where the Council decides
by QMV, even though, as seen, that particular
combination of decision rules implies that par-
liamentary control may be weak at both the na-
tional and the European levels. As the Finnish
Parliament has put it, the ‘democratic deficit
becomes most obvious where the Council takes
decisions by QMV without the European Par-
liament being able to prevent the legislation
coming into being’ (quoted European Parlia-
ment 1997, 12). It is also worth noting that the
EP complains about absence of full budgetary
as well as of full legislative Co-decision. It is
unclear how real is the difference between com-
pulsory and non-compulsory expenditure and
why that distinction should justify conferring
fewer powers on the EP over the first than the
second. Indeed, the EP suspects the real inten-
tion is to ‘cordon off’ the Union’s main expendi-
ture policy – the CAP - from its control (cit,
16).
Yet even where its legislative and financial
powers are at their maximum, the EP has – at
least until recently - argued that Comitology al-
lows Member States partially to negate the ben-
efits of using a directly elected Co-decider as a
check and a balance on the Council. In the EP’s
view, Comitology committees do not ‘merely
implement’ but ‘modify and ‘supplement essen-
tial aspects of legislative provisions’ (European
Parliament 1998, 6/2003, 7). Thus they allow
administrators and experts appointed by the
Member States to make substantive choices
about the allocation of values that should be Co-
decided by the Parliament and Council. It re-
mains to be seen how far a new inter-institu-
tional agreement concluded in 2006 will resolve
these problems. The rapporteur on the agree-
ment, Richard Corbett, concluded that it did put
the EP on an ‘equal footing’ with the Council
in being able to scrutinize and then reject im-
plementing measures which amount to delegated
legislation, rather than mere policy execution.
However, Corbett also notes that the inter-insti-
tutional agreement does not go so far as the
Constitutional Treaty which would also have
allowed the Parliament to revoke the delegation
of powers once made (European Parliament
2006b, 5).
Turning to the second and third pillars, the
Treaty only requires the Council to consult the
EP on CFSP and JHA decisions and to report
annually on the overall development of the two
policies. Yet, the EP has expressed concern that
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the Council has used CFSP and JHA to delegate
powers to unaccountable agencies. Council
agencies do not have executives whose mal-
administration can occasion censure by the EP.
Nor are they covered by general legislation on
administrative standards in Union institutions
such as the regulations on the processing of per-
sonal data and access to documents. Moreover,
the exclusion of the ECJ from all of CFSP and
much of JHA means that lacunae in responsi-
bility to elected bodies are not compensated by
judicial accountability or individual rights pro-
tections (European Parliament 2001b).
In the case of JHA, Council agencies include
Europol (police co-operation), Eurojust (pros-
ecuting magistrates), and the Schengen Secre-
tariat (Frontier management). Although they are
mainly co-ordinating mechanisms, Council
agencies seem on occasions to exercise discre-
tionary powers. The Europol Director, for ex-
ample, has been authorised by the Council to
enter discussions with third countries on behalf
of the Union (OJ.C. 106, 13 April 2000). Above
all, the agencies are key sites for the transposi-
tion of JHA orientations into policing on the
ground. Eurojust has been authorised to initiate
joint investigations and prosecutions in cases
of cross-border crime, and to make joint rec-
ommendations to Member States on changes to
criminal law in each country. Plans to create a
joint Police training College – and to exchange
‘best practice’ – imply norms of policing may
in the future be partially defined through col-
laborative processes at European level, rather
than exclusively through agencies that are lo-
cally or nationally accountable. Amongst pri-
orities the Council set for the College were
‘training sessions for senior national police of-
ficers on the basis of common standards’ (Eu-
ropean Parliament 2001c).
4. Conclusion
EU institutions and its Member States often
claim that public control of the Union is possi-
ble through a system of dual representation.
Amongst other things, this implies that the in-
dividual members of the Council can be account-
able to national parliaments, whilst the decisions
of the Council as a whole can be checked and
balanced by the EP at the level of the EU’s po-
litical system itself. Clarity of exposition de-
mands that the two processes be analysed sepa-
rately from one another, and this article has not
attempted to deviate from that conventional
path. Yet, as discussed in the introduction, the
notion of dual representation is ultimately a
claim that national parliaments and the Euro-
pean Parliament can interact to produce satis-
factory democratic control of Union decisions.
Not only is there little academic research into
the interaction of the two roles, but, one sus-
pects, political practice has itself only tested a
narrow range of the possibilities for either co-
operation or mutual watchfulness in the rela-
tionship between national parliaments and the
European Parliament in their monitoring of the
Council.
Still, some conjectures can already be at-
tempted. To the extent that an understanding of
what can be changed and what cannot contrib-
utes to institutional design, a useful starting point
might be to hypothesise what constraints on dual
representation are likely to be structural in the
sense that they can be expected to arise even
where national parliaments or the European
Parliament perform their allotted roles. For ex-
ample it is hard to see how EP’s complaint that
‘neither the Council nor the European Council
can incur ultimate political censure, since no
vote of confidence is possible either in national
parliaments or the European Parliament’ (Eu-
ropean Parliament 1997, 5) could ever be satis-
fied within a dual system of representation.
National parliaments can only control individual
Council Members and in a system of shared rep-
resentation it is hardly for the EP to control by
whom Member States want to be represented in
the Council. Dual representation is thus closely
related to Joe Weiler’s (1997, 275) observation
that ‘critically there is no real sense in which
the European process allows the electorate to
“throw the scoundrels out”… to replace one set
(my emphasis) of “governors” by another’. Dual
representation can accommodate the power of
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national parliaments to remove individual Coun-
cil Members and that of the EP to censure the
Commission but with respect to the residue left
over after these two powers have been taken into
account – control of the Council and European
Council as collective bodies – it requires confi-
dence in means other than dismissal from of-
fice.
If dual representation constrains any repre-
sentative body from exercising an over-arching
public control of the Union, what structural con-
straints does it imply for national parliaments
or the EP only? On the strength of this article
we might predict that even national parliaments
with strong controlling powers over the behav-
iour of their governments in the Council will
struggle on their own to deliver the political
equality or the deliberative conditions for de-
mocracy at the European Union level. We might
also predict that any difficulties national parlia-
ments face in constraining the collective opera-
tion of Council decision-making will limit their
individual powers.
Turning to the European Parliament, it fol-
lows directly from the very notion of dual rep-
resentation that the EP will only be able to check
and balance the Council within certain bounds.
From that we might, in turn, predict that dual
representation will operate as a structural limi-
tation on direct representation itself. As seen,
the Union has failed to develop the politics of
direct representation – in the sense of elections
contested on choices relevant to the operation
of the Union itself – although it has a directly
elected Parliament. A possible reason for this is
that the opportunity to decide who is going to
exercise the European Parliament’s part share
in the powers of an institutional order whose
capacity to re-allocate values is incremental,
dependent on high-levels of consensus, and,
arguably, substantially pre-decided by prior
processes of Treaty formation is a weak mobi-
lising force (Bartolini 2005; Blondel et al. 1998,
251-3; Mair 2005). In contrast, national parlia-
mentary elections designate (if only indirectly)
the range of key legislative and executive of-
fices in what Kaare Strøm (2003, 65) calls a sin-
gular chain of delegation. Indeed, they even
confer a part share in Union decision-making, a
factor that may paradoxically even depress turn
out in European elections in those Member
States where national parliaments are thought
broadly capable of controlling the contribution
of their own governments to Council decisions.
Yet as also seen, it is hard to imagine any depar-
ture from dual representation given the Union’s
under-developed demos and its need to negoti-
ate its policies with its Member States if they
are to be carried out on the ground. As Phillip
Dann (2006, 238) puts it, ‘since EU law is im-
plemented by national administrations’ those
same administrations have to be given ‘voice’
in the ‘making of laws’.
All of this suggests a theoretical framework
for appraising options for institutional reform.
In contrast to Fritz Scharpf’s (1999, 188) well-
known suggestion that the European level
should concentrate on meeting output conditions
for democracy (capacities for collective action
in economic and social policy) and the national
level on meeting ‘input’ conditions (demos,
parties, media and so on), this article has dis-
cussed an alternative division of labour con-
structed around the distinction between indi-
vidual and collective responsibility. Taking ac-
countability as an essential ingredient of respon-
sibility, further development of this division of
labour might be appraised for what it could do
to encourage participants in the Council to give
reasons for their decisions subject to threats of
sanction where the public or its representatives
consider explanations inadequate.
A few observations about the political op-
portunity structure all this implies for reform
are in order, even though space does not permit
consideration of concrete options. Any success
on the part of one Parliament at either level in
improving the quality of ‘reason-giving’ for
Council decisions will be a public good with all
the qualities and shortcomings that implies. To
the extent that the development of expertise and
the extraction of information are not cost-free,
there will be a tendency for the public good to
be under-supplied. But once the information is




Turning now to the issue of sanctions, dif-
ferent possibilities suggest themselves at the two
levels. Sanction through loss of office can, as
has been seen, only be arranged through the
application to individual members of the Coun-
cil of Ministers of whatever arrangements na-
tional political systems make for ministerial re-
sponsibility; or, indeed, through a spill-over, so
far untested to the best of my knowledge, from
Council decision-making to domestic electoral
competition. Sanction through the denial of
policy outcomes may, however, be best arranged
through the European Parliament. As things
stand, national parliaments may be individual
veto-holders where the Council of Ministers
votes by unanimity; and they may be veto-hold-
ers in combination where the Council votes by
QMV. The latter, though, is a somewhat capri-
cious controlling power, since it depends on
those who happen to have an interest in exer-
cising control happening to be those with man-
dating powers over the behaviour of their gov-
ernments in the Council. The need to look to
the EP to sanction by denying policy outcomes
might point to further extensions in legislative
Co-decision or – as was attempted by the Con-
stitution – full Co-decision over the budget. It
might also suggest more Co-decision in the
making of specific appointments and even in
the setting of mandates for particular agencies
where policy execution is not delegated to the
Commission. Finally, sanction through loss of
reputation – through plain political embarrass-
ment – might be reinforced through the devel-
opment of a fierce culture of political interro-
gation at either level. Surely there is scope here
for both national parliaments and the European
Parliament to make greater and more co-
ordinated use of committees of enquiry into
policy failures and the contribution, if any, of
Council decisions to them.
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